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Abstract
When Pinatubo re-awakened in early 1991, very few people within the
vicinity were familiar with volcanic hazards, and even fewer believed that
Pinatubo could impact them. Scientists knew more, but were still
struggling to answer:
• How often and how explosively did Pinatubo erupt, and when was its
most recent eruption?
• What precursors could be expected in advance of a very large (VEI  6)
explosive eruption?
• What was happening beneath Pinatubo that was driving 1991 unrest?
To reach an exceptionally diverse audience and to counter widespread
scepticism, scientists tried a whole package of communication measures,
including simpliﬁed alert levels; a “worst case” hazard map; a probability
tree; personalized brieﬁngs for local and national government ofﬁcials,
military and civil defense ofﬁcials, nuns, and the news media; use of a
IAVCEI video on volcanic hazards on broadcast TV and in brieﬁngs; vol-
canology tutorials for school teachers; talks on the mountain with villagers
and anti-government guerrillas; and beer and hotdogs too. Forecasts were
just-in-time and generally correct about what areas would be at risk. Overall,
pre-eruption communication achieved its goal of getting people out of
harm’s way. Three lessons stand out: use simple, multipronged communi-
cations, especially video; include worst case scenarios in your warnings,
together with estimated probabilities thereof; and be willing, as scientists
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and decision makers, to recommend evacuations even if uncertainty is still
high and there is still a chance offalse alarm. Formore than a decade after the
1991 eruption, rain-induced lahars threatened even more people and more
infrastructure than the eruption itself. Several groups of scientists and
engineers worked on the lahar threat, each coming up with slightly different
long-term assessments that appeared to the public as bickering or incom-
petence. Scientists’ credibility was seriously diminished. Decisions of what
lahar-mitigation projects to build—including a succession of inadequate
ones—were influenced less by science and more by public pressure, prag-
matism, back-room politics, and proﬁt. Short-term or immediate lahar
warnings were communicated by scientists and by police-manned watch
points. The scientiﬁc warnings were technically superior but the police
warnings had greater credibility, as they were from familiar sources and
easily understood. Communication of hazard information at Pinatubo saved
many lives, andwe are proud and privileged to have been part of preventing a
much worse disaster. However, margins of safety were narrow and some
deaths that did occur could have been prevented by better communication.
1 Introduction
The 1991–92 eruptions of Mount Pinatubo,
Philippines, would affect a population in Central
Luzon that was unfamiliar with and initially
sceptical about volcanic hazards. That population
was exceptionally diverse, including indigenous
Aeta people on the volcano itself, helped by
trusted nuns and pastors, and sharing the volcano
with a small but influential band of guerrillas of
the New Peoples’ Army. Around the volcano
were nearly a million lowland Filipinos in several
large cities and towns of three provinces, and two
large American military bases that were more
like America than the Philippines. And in the
skies above and around Pinatubo, commercial as
well as military aviation had to be alerted.
Following small phreatic explosions on April
2, 1991, a team of Filipino and American sci-
entists were trying urgently to decipher the his-
tory of the volcano and the unrest. What little we
knew of Pinatubo’s geologic history indicated
that a major explosive eruption was possible, and
geophysical and geochemical monitoring—just
started—was indicating continuing but (as-yet)
not escalating unrest. It was not clear that the
volcano WOULD erupt, but it was clear that
IF IT DID, the eruption was likely to be large and
explosive.
Facing strong scepticism from ofﬁcials and
the public unfamiliar with volcanic threats, and
with no indication of how much time remained
before an eruption could occur, we had to
quickly ﬁnd ways to teach about volcanoes and
overcome that scepticism. If unrest escalated,
ofﬁcials would have to be convinced to evacuate
large numbers of people to safety. Unrest did
escalate, and most of those at high risk were
successfully evacuated.
After the large eruption of June 15, 1991,
focus shifted to the hazard of rain- (and lake-)
related lahars. Though there was more time for a
lahar information campaign, the long (>10 year)
duration complicated the effort. Again, large
numbers of people were at risk, and nearly all
were moved to safety.
Although communications and mitigation
were broadly successful, we stress that the suc-
cesses were often “just in time” and “just barely
enough.” Most of the deaths that did occur could
have been prevented, and many more deaths
could have occurred had the eruption or the
lahars been slightly sooner or larger. We tell this
2 C. Newhall and R.U. Solidum
story in the hope that it will help colleagues in
similar situations in the future add margins of
safety.
2 Audiences: Who Needed to Learn
About Volcanic and Lahar
Hazard?
Audiences for our hazard communications were
primarily decision-makers, community opinion
leaders, and the news media. They in turn con-
veyed hazard messages and suggested actions to
the public. Given that the total population at risk
was roughly 1 million, the task was large and
messages would need to be disseminated through
many levels and in many ways. Scientists com-
municated directly with hundreds of ofﬁcials at
various levels, and they in turn reached out to the
million.
In the Philippines, there is a well-established
hierarchy of government and NGO bodies
charged with disaster risk mitigation. At the top
is the National Disaster Risk Reduction and
Management Council (NDRRMC), known at
that time as the National Disaster Coordinating
Council, (NDCC), which includes top civilian,
military, NGO ofﬁcials, and scientists. The
executive arm of the NDRRMC is the national
Ofﬁce of Civil Defense (OCD), led at the time by
Engineer Fortunato Dejoras. Similar crisis coor-
dinating functions are replicated at the regional
(RDRRMC), provincial (PDRRMC), city or
municipal (MDRRMC), and barangay (village)
level, and execution is by local ofﬁces of OCD
and corresponding ofﬁces of other government
agencies and NGOs. Needs are assessed from the
bottom or middle up; decisions are made mostly
at the regional or provincial level, or higher if
necessary, and passed down to local levels. In the
case of volcanic hazards, assessments and rec-
ommendations are made by the Director of the
Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seis-
mology (PHIVOLCS), or his/her designated
representative.
At and around Pinatubo, virtually no one in
this hierarchy had experience with volcanic
hazards, so all needed urgent education. The sole
exceptions were geoscientists from PHIVOLCS,
joined by colleagues from the US Geological
Survey (USGS) and a few university-based
geoscientists.
News media had perhaps slightly more expe-
rience with volcanic hazards, but not much.
There are relatively few science reporters in the
Philippines, and some of the best reporters turned
out to be generalist regional reporters who
familiarized themselves with the issues better
than national reporters who were pulled in many
more directions.
Before the climactic eruption of June 15,
1991, nearly all communications with the pre-
ceding groups were led by the late Dr. Ray-
mundo Punongbayan, then-director of
PHIVOLCS. Ray was a talented communicator
who quickly earned the trust of those he briefed.
Brieﬁngs were held for the NDCC (in a meeting
led by then-Defense Secretary and later President
Fidel Ramos), for the Governors and staff of the
three provinces that adjoin at the summit of
Pinatubo (Zambales, Pampanga, and Tarlac), and
for the Mayor of Angeles City. The Mayor of
Olongapo City had the beneﬁt of personal advice
from several university-based scientists, includ-
ing Dr. Kelvin Rodolfo and a young PHIVOLCS
scientist, here the 2nd author. Other mayors
joined the provincial level meetings. Dr.
Punongbayan also developed a good rapport with
news media, and he tapped them to help dis-
seminate information. Other PHIVOLCS and
USGS scientists were largely free to concentrate
on ﬁeld work and data interpretation, undis-
tracted by media because Dr. Punongbayan
handled their requests.
The American military bases were
self-contained, with their own command structure,
logistics, hospital, schools, businesses, and the
like. Although the primary mission of the USGS
scientists was to work with long-time PHIVOLCS
colleagues in support of the PHIVOLCS mission,
the USGS scientists were also granted access to
logistical resources of the US military and, in
return, kept the US military informed of devel-
opments in parallel with communications to the
NDCC. Because the USAir Force was preparing a
contingency plan in case evacuation became
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necessary, it sought scientiﬁc advice not only for
commanders but also for enlisted personnel on
whom base operations depended, for teachers, and
for hospital staff. An initial attempt to also teach
schoolchildren about the hazard had to be aban-
doned—for lack of time—in favour of a
single-day brieﬁng for all science teachers of
Clark Air Base.
3 Pre-eruption Messages
One might liken the scientiﬁc effort—and the
communication effort—to running a race against
an unknown competitor, Pinatubo. At the time of
the ﬁrst phreatic explosions on April 2, 1991, no
instruments monitored the volcano and there
were no background data of monitoring. Fortu-
nately, there was some prior geologic knowledge
of Pinatubo, from a site safety study for a nearby
nuclear power plant and from exploration for
geothermal power, which told of what HAD
happened before and COULD happen again, but
what ofﬁcials wanted was information about
what WOULD happen. Furthermore, even
worldwide, there was no information about the
expectable precursors of a VEI 6 eruption, which
we could see from the geology was a strong
possibility.
Scientists, by training, are conservative in
what they say. Data must be ample and con-
vincing, and uncertainties should be low before a
paper is published or advice is given. However,
that conservatism must sometimes be overridden
in times of volcanic crises.
In chronologic order, pre-eruption messages
evolved through the following sequence:
• Pinatubo is a volcano, and is restless, so here
is a primer on volcanic hazards (April–May).
• Near the volcano, the only way to protect
yourself is to evacuate before an eruption. We
may recommend evacuations from within 10,
15, 20 km radius (later, adding 30 and
40 km radius). (With radii adjusted for each
speciﬁc volcano, this is a standard PHI-
VOLCS message in the face of any volcanic
crisis) (April–June).
• We are not yet sure whether Pinatubo WILL
erupt, but if it does, the eruption will be big
and bad (late April).
• Evidence (as of May 13) shows that rising
magma is causing the unrest.
• Even though this volcano is new to us too, we
will try to raise alerts progressively if an
eruption is approaching, giving you days up
to two weeks of advance warning and, later,
ﬁnal notice hours or a day before an eruption
(May 13).
• In return, we ask you (ofﬁcials and the public)
to understand that there might be a false alarm
or two along the way. Please bear with us.
• Many areas have been swept by lethal vol-
canic flows in the past, or affected by ashfall,
and could be similarly affected by a new
eruption (hazard map, May 23).
• The volcano MAY erupt within 2 weeks
(June 5).
• The volcano MAY erupt within 24 h (June 7).
All within a 20 km radius of the summit
should evacuate.
• The volcano has started to erupt, though only
with a lava dome (June 7).
• The volcano has started explosive eruptions
(June 9).
• Even though what you saw yesterday and
today was impressive, the big one is still to
come (June 12, 13, 14). On June 14, all those
within 30 km radius of the summit should
evacuate.
• A typhoon will arrive on June 15 (message
from the weather bureau PAGASA).
• A massive eruption is in progress (June 15).
Those within 40 km radius of the summit
should evacuate, a recommendation easier
made than followed.
Our message about possible false alarms was
given in brieﬁngs to Governors and other
decision-makers. Volcanologists have been
notably averse to false alarms ever since the 1976
crisis at Soufrière Guadeloupe (Fiske 1984) and
initially, we worried about this at Pinatubo as
well. But we were reassured in our brieﬁng in
Zambales province when one of the attendees, a
nun working with indigenous Aetas, told us they
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would happily accept premature warnings. They
were more concerned that warnings might be too
late. Not all would have been so forgiving, but
we took the nun’s words to heart. Social science
research on earthquake and weather hazards
recognizes some so-called “cry-wolf” reduction
in scientiﬁc credibility (e.g., Atwood and Major
1998), but less than often presumed (Dow and
Cutter 1998; Barnes et al. 2007 and references
therein).
One communication that was, in retrospect,
underemphasized, warned of ash in areas far
from the volcano. Although warning was tech-
nically made, it was not emphasized sufﬁciently,
especially in light of the typhoon rain that almost
doubled the weight of ash on roofs and led to
most of the eruption-related deaths. Another
result of this under-emphasis was failure to warn
aircraft outside the Philippine Flight Information
Region (FIR), mostly over Indochina. We
thought we had the aviation hazard covered
through the Philippine FIR, and didn’t even think
of FIR’s beyond the Philippines.
Additional details of eruption warnings,
including dates and text of alert levels and rec-
ommendations for evacuation radii, may be
found in Punongbayan et al. (1996) and Tayag
et al. (1996).
4 How Were the Warnings
Prepared and Presented?
4.1 Briefings and Video
By mid-May, as soon as we were reasonably sure
that magma was rising and we had drafts of
warning materials, the Ofﬁce of Civil Defense
arranged for the Director of PHIVOLCS (Dr.
Punongbayan) to brief the Governors of each
affected province (Pampanga, Zambales, and
Tarlac), and the Mayor of Angeles City. The
Governors, in turn, arranged for attendance of
town mayors, captains of barangays closest to the
volcano, and representatives of NGOs and news
media. The general format of each meeting
included an introduction by the Governor or
Vice-Governor, followed by presentation of what
scientists knew about Pinatubo in general and
about the hazard facing each province, and
showing and discussion of a rough cut of the
IAVCEI video “Understanding Volcanic
Hazards” prepared by Maurice Krafft and others.
Finally, there would be open discussion of gen-
eral mitigation steps, though most discussion of
speciﬁc mitigation steps came after these brief-
ings. In most of these brieﬁngs, attention levels
were high and many good questions were asked;
in only one, that for the Mayor of Angeles City,
was there ofﬁcial disinterest or hostility.
The IAVCEI video deserves special mention.
Shortly after the terrible mudflow (lahar) disaster
at Nevado del Ruiz Volcano (Colombia) in 1985,
volcanologists agonized over how to prevent
such disasters in the future. Because people of
Armero and other towns at risk seemed not to
have understood the seriousness of warnings they
received, they did not walk to safety even though
they could have done so. Apparently, they did
not understand that a “flujo de lodo” (literally, a
flow of mud) could in fact be a huge wall of mud,
sand, boulders, trees, and more. Accordingly,
Maurice Krafft and others set out to make a video
that showed, in starkly graphic ways, the nature
of each volcanic hazard, how far and fast it
travels, and what it does when it hits houses and
people. The ad-hoc steering committee for this
video debated whether to include dead bodies—
lest audiences ﬁnd it too hard to watch—but in
the end decided for inclusion to shock audiences
into attention. Pinatubo was the next big event to
threaten a population unfamiliar with volcanic
hazards and, fortunately, scientists had by then a
rough cut of Maurice’s video, sufﬁcient for
public screening. This video was highly effec-
tive. Many who simply hadn’t grasped the threat
before seeing this video became converts soon
after. The old saying, “A picture is worth 1000
words” might be re-written to say a “A video is
worth 1,000,000 words!” Interestingly, we found
no great revulsion from scenes of dead bodies—
perhaps TV programming had already made this
an everyday sight. But a short clip of a young girl
trapped and shivering in the Armero lahar
deposit drew audible gasps of horror in every
brieﬁng. It was VERY effective.
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Unaware yet of its powerful reception at
Pinatubo, Maurice Krafft and his wife Katia were
dissatisﬁed with the video’s footage of pyro-
clastic flows (much better footage is available
now), so enroute to Pinatubo they stopped at
Unzen to get better footage. They misjudged the
threat and were themselves killed by a pyro-
clastic flow. That sad irony further increased the
impact of the video as it was shown at Pinatubo.
Although technically the video was copy-
righted by IAVCEI, we decided in the interest of
time and the spirit in which the video was made
to show it on broadcast TV and to distribute
copies freely at each brieﬁng. No doubt many
copies of copies were also made. Today, one
might post a video on YouTube; at that time,
none of today’s social media were available.
Readers of this paper wishing to order a
re-mastered DVD of this video, and a sequel,
may order it at http://www.volcanovideo.com/
p1IAVCEI.html.
In addition to brieﬁngs at the provincial level,
Dr. Punongbayan also gave brieﬁngs to key
national leaders. In one, he briefed then-President
Corazon Aquino. In another, led by
then-Secretary of National Defense Fidel Ramos
and held at Camp Aguinaldo, he briefed assem-
bled Cabinet members and other key ofﬁcials.
We recall a multi-tasking, busy Gen. Ramos
calling a timeout after this brieﬁng, and remark-
ing to Dr. Punongbayan that he heard the mes-
sage loud and clear, and half-joked that the
Philippine government had better hurry up the
renegotiation of the RP-US military bases
agreement before there was nothing left to
negotiate about.
While Dr. Punongbayan handled brieﬁngs at
the national and provincial levels and for the
media, several other members of the joint
PHIVOLCS-USGS team provided brieﬁngs at
lower levels. One PHIVOLCS team was based in
villages on the NW flank of Pinatubo and quickly
developed trust and provided information on the
hazard. Field parties often encountered and
stopped to talk with other villagers. One time, a
group approached our helicopter while we were
installing a seismic station. Other times, we
stopped in roadside villages on our way to study
outcrops, and the requisite courtesy call on a
village captain would inevitably and fruitfully
turn into quite a long discussion. In one village,
we met with both indigenous Aetas and rebel
guerrillas of the New People’s Army. In another
village from which the volcano could not even be
seen, we didn’t ﬁnd the village captain so we
spoke instead with his wife, who seemed not to
understand at all, yet we know that residents of
this village did ultimately evacuate to safety.
These encounters and outreach were by no means
comprehensive. A few PHIVOLCS scientists
started systematic outreach in towns around the
foot of the volcano, but owing to limits in time
and transport, most of our outreach was boot-
legged onto our ﬁeld work.
Those of us on Clark Air Base at the East foot
of Pinatubo also provided near-daily brieﬁngs for
military ofﬁcers and ofﬁcials from nearby towns.
We spoke to several classes of schoolchildren but
quickly realized that the only way we could reach
larger numbers would be to teach the teachers,
especially science teachers. Inside Clark Air
Base, a session for science teachers was quickly
arranged; outside the base, we connected with
only a few teachers, far from all.
Also within Clark Air Base, we gave brieﬁngs
to individual units including the hospital and, at
the suggestion of the Deputy Base Commander,
to a level of staff called “chief master sergeants.”
The “chiefs” were eminently practical—the real
“doers” of the base. Our makeshift Pinatubo
Volcano Observatory (PVO), in a crowded
apartment for enlisted personnel, became a hub
for curious and concerned daily visitors, includ-
ing the base meteorologists, ofﬁcers, and even
their wives. On one occasion when activity
ramped up, we summoned top ofﬁcers of Clark
and Subic to PVO. Their arrival by helicopter
and thence in cars bearing the flags of admirals
and generals drew quite a lot of attention and
gossip throughout the base. Because we relied
initially on the base weather ofﬁce for access to a
fax machine, US Air Force weathermen (and by
extension, their superior ofﬁcers) were also privy
to fax communications between scientiﬁc team at
Clark and Director Punongbayan in Manila. One
fax from Director Punongbayan, about alert
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levels if we recall, arrived at PVO with yellow
highlights! Even though the Base Commander
wanted to keep our work quiet, there was really
no way to do so, and occasional breaches were
actually quite useful! Finally, in late May, the US
Air Force command realized it needed to run an
interview with a scientist on the base TV station,
but the interview was tightly scripted and the
pre-scripted wrap-up by the interviewer was
much more reassuring than the interview itself.
4.2 Alert Levels
We soon recognized that, given the large, diverse
audience and widespread unfamiliarity with the
threat, all of our warnings would need to be very
simple. One such simpliﬁcation was deﬁnition of
numbered alert levels from 0 (no unrest) to 5
(large explosive eruption in progress) (for details,
see Punongbayan et al. 1996; Tayag et al. 1996).
These were patterned, from vague and stressed
memory, on alert levels ﬁrst introduced at Rabaul
(Papua New Guinea) and later adapted for
eruptions in Alaska (USA) (see brief histories of
alert levels in Fearnley et al. 2012; Fearnley
2013; Winson et al. 2014). Levels 3 and 4 of the
Pinatubo scheme anticipated forecast time win-
dows (2 weeks and 24 h) within which an
eruption might occur, and each level had an
interpretation of activity. We intended that Civil
Defense could design and key their mitigation
actions to these alert levels. Probably, they would
have done so had not events developed so rapidly
in early June that –in effect—recommended
evacuation radii from the Director of PHIVOLCS
pre-empted plans that Civil Defense was still
preparing. In recent years there has been much
re-examination of alert schemes and debate of
whether they should include forecasts and formal
linkage to responses, making scientists de-facto
decision makers. Given the extreme urgency at
Pinatubo, we think both the forecast and the
de-facto decision-making role of PHIVOLCS
were necessary, though we acknowledge that
these matters should be discussed and agreed
elsewhere on a country-by-country basis.
PHIVOLCS and civil defense leaders still link
alert levels and responses, but in recognition of
uncertainties and differences between volcanoes,
PHIVOLCS has made the forecast windows less
precise.
The general upward progression of levels
resembled a familiar 3-level alert used for
typhoons in the Philippines, but had the opposite
sense to a countdown of alerts used by the US
military. Fortunately, the US military agreed to
use our scheme rather than their own.
We did note one misunderstanding of the
wording on the alert levels. For alert levels 3 and
4, the wording stated that “an eruption was
possible within (a speciﬁed timeframe, 2 weeks
or 24 h).” Strictly speaking, we meant that we
could no longer guarantee that an eruption would
not occur within that period; however, the sim-
pler reading of “could occur within that time-
frame” would have been an acceptable
simpliﬁcation. In Pilipino, that would have been
stated as “ma-aaring mangyari sa loob ng (dala-
wang lingo o 24 oras).” Perhaps since we wrote it
only in English, many misread it to mean that “an
eruption WILL occur within 2 weeks or 24 h”
or, worse yet, “an eruption WILL occur in
exactly 2 weeks or 24 h.” If differences between
the terms “could occur” versus “will occur”, and
between “in” versus “within” might be misun-
derstood, use the local language to clarify! No
serious harm was done, as those making ﬁnal
evacuation recommendations understood the
terms as intended.
Our alert level scheme also included guidance
for step down, with built-in delays to guard
against premature lowering of alert levels. We
think such guidance for step-downs is helpful,
partly to guard against sudden decreases in
activity that are “calm before the storm,” and
partly to allow orderly stepdown, without
embarrassment, should unrest truly stop. Many
magma intrusions fail to reach the surface and
moveable alert levels (up and down) are designed
as an alternative to forecasts that may prove
wrong. In the case of Pinatubo, we didn’t have
occasion to use the stepdown until well after the
climactic eruption.
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4.3 Pre-eruption Hazard Map
Hazard maps are the geoscientist’s standard
response to the question, “What areas are at
risk?” Our pre-eruption map was based mainly
on quick reconnaissance of the maximum extent
of pyroclastic flows from past eruptions of
Pinatubo. In most areas this was immediately
obvious both on the ground and on aerial photos.
Our geological team doing ﬁeld work compared
notes with Director Punongbayan who was
interpreting aerial photos from his ofﬁce in
Quezon City. In most cases, the ﬁeld exposures
(in canyon walls) extended slightly beyond the
distinctive, dissected topography of old pyro-
clastic flows; in a few cases, e.g., near Barangay
Pasbul, of Floridablanca town, suspect topogra-
phy was found in aerial photos and later con-
ﬁrmed by ground visit. The aerial photos we had
were well out of date, and we note with pleasure
how much better it is to have modern satellite
coverage with current roads and quarries.
We sketched the outline of prehistoric pyro-
clastic flows onto a single sheet of paper on which
we had also traced main highways and towns. For
safety, we added 0.5–1.0 km of buffer zone
around the known pyroclastic flow extent. In our
original sketch we showed that ash could fall
anywhere on the area of the map; in a cleaned-up
sketch, the most likely directions of ashfall were
shown. Potential lahars were shown only as hash
marks down the main river channels—a simpli-
ﬁcation that would be greatly expanded after the
eruption. Without calling it as such, we intended
this map to reflect our “worst-case” scenario, VEI
6 eruptions from Pinatubo. Fortunately, the actual
reach of pyroclastic flows almost perfectly mat-
ched the hazard zones on our map, and did not
reach as far as what we later discovered was the
reach of an even larger prehistoric eruption.
These sketched maps were shown, copied and
distributed at all brieﬁngs after May 23 and also
reproduced in one or more national newspapers.
In retrospect, we can see that our hazard map
—while useful—was difﬁcult for some audiences
to understand. Many otherwise well-educated
people are unable to read maps, and maps in
standard plan view were an even more difﬁcult
abstraction for those less educated. Haynes et al.
(2007) and Leone and Lesales (2009) offer
excellent suggestions on how to make hazard
maps more readily understandable, e.g., by use of
3D visualization.
4.4 A Probability Tree
Newhall and Hoblitt (2002) and Newhall and
Pallister (2015) describe relatively simple ways
to estimate probabilities of volcanic events and
their consequences, and thereby help ofﬁcials and
those at risk to decide on what risks to take. At
Mount St. Helens, calculations were carried all
the way to annual risk of death, which allowed
loggers and others to compare volcanic risk to
more familiar occupational and lifestyle risks.
The ﬁrst probability tree at Pinatubo (May 17)
considered just one scenario, of pyroclastic flows
to the East and onto Clark Air Base. We carefully
did not exaggerate any hazard or risk, but we
wanted to make sure that ofﬁcials understood that
hazards and risk were, in fact, unacceptably high.
Our estimate of a 3% chance of pyroclastic flows
reaching Clark and killing thousands within the
coming months was immediately understood by
US Air Force ofﬁcers to be unacceptable. The
Director of the national Ofﬁce of Civil Defense,
Engr. Dejoras, saw similarly unacceptable risk
for the civilian population all around Pinatubo.
Social science research has reafﬁrmed the pitfalls
of using ambiguous adjectives like “high” or
“low” to describe hazard and risk, and the
advantages of quantifying those hazards (Doyle
et al. 2014 and references therein). Once quan-
tiﬁed, volcanic risk can be compared to more
familiar risks and to levels of risk judged
acceptable under the circumstances.
Public discussion of the probability tree at
Pinatubo might have helped in our general edu-
cation campaign, but probability is a difﬁcult
concept for many non-technical persons so for
want of time we discussed it only with those who
already understood probabilities. When we did
discuss probabilities, we usually spoke in terms
of “percent chance” or “odds” rather than strict
decimal probability numbers, as “odds” and
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frequency expressions are more easily under-
stood (Gigerenzer and Edwards 2003; Leclerc
and Joslyn 2012; Henrich et al. 2015). We did
not carry estimation of hazard all the way on to
estimation of risk, so there was no quantiﬁcation
of how much risk could be reduced by various
mitigation options. Pyroclastic flows are so lethal
that vulnerabilities would have been nearly 100%
and without evacuation, exposure would have
been 100% too. Discussion moved quickly to
plans for evacuations should an eruption become
imminent.
We did prepare one update to this tree, on
June 10, but by that time evacuation of Clark Air
Base and nearby areas was already well under-
way and the new probabilities—much higher of
course—were effectively moot.
In neither tree did we estimate uncertainty of
our probability estimates, but in brieﬁngs about
the ﬁrst tree, we did indicate that uncertainty was
at least plus or minus one order of magnitude.
Simply using probabilities already indicated
uncertainty about what would transpire. Indeed,
in every episode of volcanic unrest there is a
range of possible outcomes, including the null
event of “no eruption.” Use of probabilities,
frequencies, or odds (especially, when combined
with alert levels) allows scientists to bypass the
as-yet unreachable goal of making very speciﬁc
deterministic predictions of what will occur. Yes,
ofﬁcials and the news media will ask for such
predictions, but we believe that it is scientiﬁcally
more correct and educationally more useful to
indicate the range of possible scenarios and to
discuss how the probabilities of each scenario
can be estimated and can change. Interestingly,
recent research by Leclerc and Joslyn (2015)
found that including probabilities in frost fore-
casts increased recipients’ willingness to accept
false alarms.
4.5 Recommendations for Evacuation
In the Philippines, PHIVOLCS typically recom-
mends that a certain radius around a volcano be
declared a “permanent danger zone” and that
residence in this zone be forbidden. Outside that
zone, restrictions or measures such as evacua-
tions are at the discretion of local government
ofﬁcials. As Pinatubo had not erupted in histor-
ical time, no permanent danger zone had been
designated, nor had there been any resolutions
within provincial or municipal governments
about when and where evacuations might be
ordered. The Director of PHIVOLCS, with
blessing from the national Ofﬁce of Civil
Defense, took on the responsibility for recom-
mending radii of evacuation, and the Philippine
Army together with the Departments of Public
Works and Social Welfare and Development
implemented those recommendations. Although
an early, limited evacuation (in early April)
proved to be porous, later evacuations in June
had the advantage of visible eruptions and were
relatively smooth and effective.
Although the boundaries of hazard zones are
naturally irregular, based on topography, Direc-
tor Punongbayan and Director Dejoras decided
that recommended evacuations would be circles
with radii of 10 and 20 km (later, including 30
and 40 km). Circles drawn around the outer
boundaries of the mapped hazard inevitably
include some areas of relative high ground and
safety, but it was judged to be simpler and more
effective to base evacuations on simple circles
rather than on the boundaries of hazard maps that
some might not understand. Details are given in
Tayag et al. (1996).
4.6 Personal Communications
Most of our communications with ofﬁcials were
of the formal types listed above—brieﬁngs, alert
levels, hazard map, a probability tree, and rec-
ommended radii of evacuation. However, we
found that informal, personal communications
were sometimes just as effective as the formal
ones, if not more effective. We already men-
tioned the gut-level emotional impact elicited by
ﬁlm clips of the young girl trapped and shivering
in lahar deposit in Armero, Colombia.
A different and very effective form of personal
communication was movement of scientists
themselves to safer, fall-back positions—in the
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northwest, from Sitios (hamlets) of Tarao and
Yamot to Barangay Poonbato, and on the east,
from the center of Clark Air Base to the far
eastern edge of the air base. The move was for
our own safety, but we realized as we planned it
that our action would be a strong message for
others. As we hoped, local ofﬁcials and residents
took note and took our warnings more seriously
thereafter.
Yet another form of personal communication
was developing simple friendships and trust with
those at risk. Several members of the PHI-
VOLCS team on the northwest side of Pinatubo,
led by Julio Sabit, developed quick rapport with
local residents. Eating together, drinking toge-
ther, and sharing family histories and aspirations
are wonderful ways to build the trust that
becomes so essential when urgent warnings must
be issued. A similar experience on the east side
was generated accidentally on May 18. The sci-
entiﬁc team was exhausted and stressed, so we
called a time-out for a BBQ, inviting Air Force
ofﬁcers to join. Over hot dogs and beer, the
ofﬁcers discovered to their surprise that we sci-
entists were just normal people, with families of
our own just like them. Probably, scientists had
the same revelation about the military ofﬁcers.
Up until that time we had regarded each other
with some puzzlement and caution; after the
BBQ and beer, things lightened up and more
trust was evident.
5 Post-eruption Lahar Messages
As soon as the climactic eruption occurred, it was
obvious to scientists that the big threat in coming
years would be from rain-induced lahars (Janda
et al. 1996). We didn’t know exactly what per-
centage of the fresh deposit would be washed
into the lowlands in lahars (and in normal muddy
streamflow)—estimates ranged from around 15%
to around 50%. Even 15% of the new deposit
would be enormous and would more than ﬁll
river channels; 50% would bury huge areas of
farmland and towns under several meters of
sediment. Even on the back of an envelope,
scientists could see that these lahars would be
bigger than anything they had ever seen or
imagined. In contrast, most people at risk in the
lowlands were blissfully oblivious to the lahar
threat, grateful that they had survived the erup-
tion. Even engineers and ofﬁcials had a hard time
envisioning the scale of the impending lahars.
Our messages for long-range and short-range
lahar hazard included:
• There is an enormous amount of loose sand
and pumice on the volcano that will be car-
ried into the lowlands in coming months and
years. (unquantiﬁed, no maps yet)
• Depending on assumptions, large areas
including many towns may be buried, and
here (on hazard maps) are the areas at high
and lesser risk.
• If you build dikes to contain the sediment, most
of these will ﬁll and can breach if you don’t
build them big enough and strong enough.
• Some towns are not going to survive
unscathed and may need to be sacriﬁced.
People from those towns will need to be
resettled in other places for the foreseeable
future.
• Immediate warnings of lahars, e.g., “A
(small/large) lahar has formed in the Sacobia
River and will reach populated areas by
(speciﬁed time)”.
• Because lahars can go overbank and even
breach protective dikes, populations still
remaining at risk from these lahars should
evacuate immediately.
In the late 1990s and in 2000–2001, two more
messages were added:
• As the caldera lake ﬁlls, it will eventually
overtop and may pose a severe lahar threat to
Botolan (1998–2001).
• The threat of a breakout lahar still remains,
because we didn’t succeed to induce a rapid
scouring/ breach of the loose material that
forms a dam at the head of the
Maraunot/Balin Baquero/Bucao river system
(late 2001).
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6 How Were Lahar Warnings
Prepared and Presented?
6.1 Briefings and Video
Brieﬁngs followed more or less the same pattern
as during pre-eruption time, though more were
held at the regional level than before the eruption.
The Regional Disaster Coordinating Council
(RDCC 3) assumed a greater role for lahars than it
had before the eruption. More players were
involved as well—with notably increased
involvement by the Department of Public Works
and Highways (DPWH); the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD) (for emer-
gency relief and more permanent resettlement of
those displaced by lahars), and the new Mount
Pinatubo Commission (a mechanism to coordi-
nate funding and response, but relying heavily on
DPWH, DSWD, and their contractors).
The Krafft video was still used occasionally,
but was increasingly supplanted by live and
taped coverage of actual Pinatubo lahars, beamed
over broadcast TV. Scientists and at least two
television networks also prepared their own
video documentaries on Pinatubo lahars.
6.2 Hazard Maps
Everyone wanted to know if his or her town
would be hit by lahars. Engineers and planners
also needed to know the likely volumes of sed-
iment that would move into the lowlands, for
planning engineering structures and for debating
the relative merits of trying to control the sedi-
ment versus simply relocating communities and
letting the sediment flow.
The earliest hazard maps were prepared by
PHIVOLCS (Punongbayan et al. 1991) by the
Pinatubo Lahar Hazards Taskforce (PLHT, a
cooperative effort of the Mines and Geosciences
Bureau, Univ. of the Philippines, Univ. of Illinois
at Chicago, and PHIVOLCS) (1991a, b), and by
the Bureau of Soils and Water Management
(1991). Revised maps were prepared by Pierson
et al. (1992), PHIVOLCS (1992, 1994); and the
Zambales Lahar Scientiﬁc Monitoring Group
(ZLSMG) (1993, 1994). ZLSMG was the suc-
cessor to PLHT, comprised of university-based
scientists including some PHIVOLCS scientists
on study leave. By mutual agreement with PHI-
VOLCS, the ZLSMG handled most of the lahar
study on the west side of Pinatubo (1992, 1994).
Although there were minor differences
between the various maps, most of the maps were
broadly similar and confusion between maps
seemed not to be a serious problem. Greater
confusion may have arisen over the use of lines
rather than gradations. Lines are satisfying, but
they inevitably give a sense of more certainty than
actually exists. Lahar hazard in lowland areas is
gradational, without sharp boundaries.
Later, PHIVOLCS was given an additional
duty of certifying whether speciﬁc land parcels
(e.g., those for new construction and bank loans)
were “safe” or “unsafe” from lahar. In general,
that meant simply locating the parcel of land on
the published hazard map and certifying that it
was inside or outside hazard zones. Though
unstated, delineation of “safe” zones implies a
choice of how low a hazard must be in order to
call the zone safe. Everything was changing too
fast for us to identify an “X-year floodplain” (one
event in X years) but qualitatively, areas outside
the hazard zones were judged to have “very or
extremely low” probability of being inundated.
In general, the hazard maps served dual pur-
poses of letting communities know their (quali-
tative) chances of being buried in the coming
years, and letting engineers and planners design
appropriate responses. To be sure, some mitiga-
tion measures were technically inadequate or
even foolish (e.g., construction in 1992 of a new
school in Sta. Barbara, Bacolor, which would
soon be buried by more lahars), but these
instances were not for want of good scientiﬁc
information. More likely, they were driven by
inattention, bureaucracy, politics, or proﬁt.
6.3 Short-Term, Immediate Lahar
Warnings
Four systems were used for lahar warnings. One,
installed by DPWH with information fed by
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radio telemetry directly to the RDCC at Camp
Olivas, San Fernando, used trip wires and rain
gauges, placed near the foot of a pyroclastic fan
and the head of the corresponding alluvial apron.
They didn’t last long, with the trip wires almost
immediately tripped or stolen. A second, instal-
led by PHIVOLCS and the USGS, used rain
gauges high in the watershed and acoustic flow
sensors (inexpensive, high-frequency exploration
seismometers) lower on the pyroclastic fans but
still above the alluvial fans. Data were teleme-
tered to PVO where they were interpreted 24/7,
and warnings were relayed to RDCC by tele-
phone. Sometimes, PHIVOLCS observers would
also report from watchpoints but these were not
an essential part of PHIVOLCS’ warnings.
A third was direct observations of lahars by
scientists from the ZLSMG, from watchpoints
they manned in Dalanaoan, San Marcelino, and
Malumboy, Botolan. Dalanaoan was midway
down the alluvial fan of the Marella/Sto. Tomas
River but still upstream from populated areas;
Malumboy was well down the Bucao River but
still 11 km upstream from Botolan. Results were
sent in real-time to authorities. The fourth system
also used direct observations of lahars, by
policemen posted near the heads of several
alluvial fans who then radioed reports to the
RDCC.
Of the four systems, the PHIVOLCS and
ZLSMG systems were scientiﬁcally superior,
giving early and semi-quantitative information
about both the scale and the travel speed of
lahars, and the beneﬁt of scientiﬁc interpretation.
In retrospect, the PHIVOLCS system would have
been better accepted if one of its scientists with
good communication skills had spent more time
at the RDCC. The police reports were less
accurate than those from scientists but had the
advantage of being simple and from familiar
sources.
Because everyday thundershowers at Pinatubo
are very localized, and neither the national
meteorological service (PAGASA) nor the mili-
tary had modern Doppler radar, meteorologists
did not play as great a role at Pinatubo as they
would today. However, they did make major
contributions by warning of incoming typhoons
that invariably generated lahars across the entire
volcano.
In general, short-term lahar warnings did
reach those at risk and saved many hundreds or
even thousands of lives. Regrettably, they didn’t
manage to save all. We recall one instance in
which PHIVOLCS had strong evidence for a
lahar headed for Dolores, Mabalacat, and relayed
its warning, but local ofﬁcials deferred to the
police system which did not sound the same
alarm. Approximately 100 died as a result. In
another instance, all systems warned of a major
lahar headed for Bacolor town (by then, largely
evacuated) and its satellite barangay, Cabalantian
(not evacuated). Unfortunately, a large dike gave
a false sense of security until it breached, and as
many as 400 of those who did not evacuate
perished.
6.4 Probabilities of Lahars
No effort was made to estimate either long-term
or short-term probabilities of lahars. Most of the
effort toward quantiﬁcation was focused on
estimating rates of sediment transport, both in
lahars and in normal muddy streamflow.
6.5 Personal Factors
Ironically, the extra time afforded by lahars
(relative to the pre-eruption period) created extra
difﬁculties in communication. There were more
end-users to be informed, and more scientists
providing the information. In addition to the
main players mentioned above, there were also
engineering consultants from many countries.
Scientists operating on limited (sometimes,
shoestring) budgets anticipated the magnitude of
the lahar hazard while engineers turned that
information into lucrative contracts for sediment
control and reconstruction.
There were, we must admit, some unfortunate
clashes between scientists which contributed to
the loss of scientiﬁc credibility. One area of
seeming disagreement was on the efﬁcacy of
engineering works. Without going into more
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details, sufﬁce it to say that both real and imag-
ined differences got translated, on front pages
and lead stories, into a personalized competition
of scientiﬁc expertise. Scientists’ credibility
would have been higher, and the public served
better, had these differences been resolved
behind closed doors, and ofﬁcials and the public
been given consensus statements.
7 Lessons to Remember
Pinatubo was a pressure-cooker for scientists,
demanding warnings well before full data sets
could be collected. Many times, we had to sup-
press our scientiﬁc instinct to say, “Wait, let me
collect more data.” Information had to be given
immediately. Timely communication of
often-uncertain hazards information, pre- and
post-eruption, saved thousands, perhaps even
tens of thousands of lives.
Below, we list some lessons that we ourselves
learned, and that we commend to readers:
• Start your communications immediately,
preferably long before unrest begins. If that is
not possible, then begin teaching about the
volcano at least start as soon as unrest is
noticed. Do NOT wait until you are sure
about what the volcano will produce. Com-
municating well with all parties takes time,
and volcanic crises can develop so quickly
that there might not be enough time for
communications if you wait until you know
more.
• Make a checklist of what data must be gath-
ered and analysed, and what information must
be communicated to whom. It would be easy,
in the rush and stress of unrest, to forget one
thing or another. Do not think of this as an
affront to your professional experience;
rather, think of it as a pilot thinks of his or her
checklist—as an extra safety measure.
• Even if the most immediate pre-eruption
concern is for pyroclastic flows, don’t forget
to warn thoroughly of ash, in the air and on
roofs. It can be life-threatening, even far from
the volcano.
• Expect scepticism, especially where a vol-
cano has long been dormant. This will make
your communication job more difﬁcult, but
also more essential. Consider using a variety
of approaches and tools (e.g., brieﬁngs, video,
hazard maps, alert levels, probability trees,
and personal touches) to reach both sceptics
and converts. Different tools will be required
for different audiences. Video is especially
effective.
• Help ofﬁcials to understand that every vol-
canic crisis has several possible outcomes,
and that their relative likelihoods may change
with time as new geologic and monitoring
data are collected. Response plans should be
flexible enough to account for several differ-
ent scenarios.
• Don’t be afraid to give warnings based on
your best current data, even if you know
those data are woefully inadequate. Some will
argue that giving interpretations and warnings
based on incomplete data may be worse than
no warnings at all. We respectfully disagree,
as we think it is scientists’ societal duty to
give the best warnings possible AT ALL
STAGES of a crisis, even early on while
uncertainties remain high. If Director
Punongbayan had not been willing to risk his
reputation and perhaps even his job to give
warnings when he did, even though uncer-
tainties remained high, we doubt that the
evacuations would have been as successful as
they were.
• Don’t be afraid to include a “worst case
scenario” among various scenarios, and put it
in context by estimating relative probabilities
of various scenarios. In the case of Pinatubo,
we saw so much geologic evidence for VEI 6
eruptions and so little evidence for smaller
eruptions that we put a high probability on the
“worst-case” VEI 6 scenario.
• Similarly, don’t be overly afraid of a false
alarm. To be sure, ofﬁcials and the public do
have limited tolerance for false alarms (e.g.,
Atwood and Major 1998), but it is not zero,
especially if you explain all of the possible
scenarios and uncertainties. Use of alert levels
and probability trees reduces the likelihood of
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false alarms. Consider also a social contract
with ofﬁcials and those at risk: If they want to
be sure of warning, they must accept some
risk of a false alarm.
• After an eruption that produces a large vol-
ume of ash and other pyroclastic debris,
expect lahars over an extended period. With
more time and players, communications will
get more complicated, and may require new,
proactive communication strategies to keep
scientiﬁc advice in the forefront of further
planning.
• Both before and after an eruption, strive for
scientiﬁc coordination of all messages
BEFORE they go to ofﬁcials and the public.
• Recognize the importance of trust and per-
sonal connections between scientists, ofﬁ-
cials, and the news media. Sometimes, these
are as important or more important than the
formal warnings.
We close this chapter, proud of the successes
but also conscious of the near-misses and fail-
ures. Communication of hazards information at
Pinatubo was complicated, but also absolutely
essential to mitigation of what would have
otherwise been a much worse disaster.
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